Nydia Ywalmoriel
09-01-2009, 06:59 PM
There were a couple of nice pieces on the BBC today discussing the 70th anniversary of the invasion of Poland that started the Second World War, as well as an excellent historical perspective on Hitler and the runup to the invasion of Poland published in Der Spiegel today:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8225093.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8230678.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8212451.stm
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,645707-2,00.html
While the role of the Soviet Union in the fate of Poland is much-discussed on the BBC, what isn't much talked about, as a friend and I were discussing last night, was the willingness of the British and French to more or less simply watch it happen (in particular the French, who had clear force superiority on the Maginot/Siegfried line and were mobilized, but then elected not to engage out of fear of the nonexistant German forces), and then lay much of the blame for the swift fall of Poland on Polish military incompetence and the Soviet pact.
On the 'military incompetence' end, nothing could be further from the truth, as the BBC piece touches on; the Polish were valiant fighters who managed to take out an armored division and 25% of Hitler's total air power (much of it by Poland's underpowered, but highly skilled, air force, which was *not* blown up on the ground, as is commonly reported) in the first two weeks of the war, while being borne down upon by the Reich's entire armor at the time (between German and Soviet forces in the conflict they were outnumbered 10:1 in armor). In addition, the Poles were skilled infantrymen, having learned in their battles after WW1 that trench warfare would not be viable in the age of armor and air power and instead deployed highly mobile units, using their relatively scarce, but well-designed and highly effective, armor as infantry support. Their error was not the decision to eschew trench warfare, but rather in placing most of their troops in the north, where the mines and other high value targets were; they simply could not keep up with the German armor, were unable to reach their defensive targets, and, once overrun, could not regroup effectively to help defend Lvov and Warsaw, and were pinned down (and mowed down) by the Luftwaffe. Even so, they defended Warsaw in the face of continuous bombing, much targeted at civilian and infrastructure targets, for over two weeks, and could have continued for several more, had General Kutrzeba not concluded that the civilian situation was too dire to continue and started capitulation talks.
Much has been made, propagandawise, of the so-called 'Western Betrayal' of Poland in the war, but I think it *is* fair to say that when push came to shove the Western powers' hearts simply weren't into diving into war for the sake of a country they'd reconstituted only twenty years before, and more for the sake of sticking it to Germany than solidarity to the long-embattled Polish people. The real tragedy of that is that the German commander Alfred Jodl confessed openly at the end of the war that
the Germans survived 1939 "only because approximately 110 French and English divisions in the West, which during the campaign on Poland were facing 25 German divisions, remained completely inactive."
While their ability to mobilize those divisions in a meaningful timeframe is in some question (although 90 French divisions faced 20 German on their western line and had in fact been mobilized in the first week of September), there is no question whatsoever that Hitler was a master of the bluff, and they believed they faced far greater forces. It is perhaps a bit karmic to think that by failing to do so while they had the advantage they condemned not only Poland, but their home soil, to years of occupation if only a shadow of the massive destruction Poland suffered.
Then again, I don't think that either country could have imagined the willingness to destroy civilians and infrastructure implicit in Hitler's concept of "Total War" (Hitler's later stated intent was to wipe Warsaw off the map, turning it into a transit station, and 85% of Warsaw was eventually levelled in 1944 after the uprising), and unfortunately, seemed to take the wrong lessons from it.
I hope that this long post was neither too boring nor presumptuous, but I took the opportunity of the anniversary to read up on much that I had not known about the events leading up to, and during, the invasion and thought it was worth reflecting on in light of the fact that the last witnesses are passing on and in light of what how these events have shaped us since with regard to our 'white Western guilt' as it were, what and whom we deem worthy of defending, and at what cost.
Regards,
Nydia
P.S. Halo, check your PMs!
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8225093.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8230678.stm
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8212451.stm
http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/0,1518,645707-2,00.html
While the role of the Soviet Union in the fate of Poland is much-discussed on the BBC, what isn't much talked about, as a friend and I were discussing last night, was the willingness of the British and French to more or less simply watch it happen (in particular the French, who had clear force superiority on the Maginot/Siegfried line and were mobilized, but then elected not to engage out of fear of the nonexistant German forces), and then lay much of the blame for the swift fall of Poland on Polish military incompetence and the Soviet pact.
On the 'military incompetence' end, nothing could be further from the truth, as the BBC piece touches on; the Polish were valiant fighters who managed to take out an armored division and 25% of Hitler's total air power (much of it by Poland's underpowered, but highly skilled, air force, which was *not* blown up on the ground, as is commonly reported) in the first two weeks of the war, while being borne down upon by the Reich's entire armor at the time (between German and Soviet forces in the conflict they were outnumbered 10:1 in armor). In addition, the Poles were skilled infantrymen, having learned in their battles after WW1 that trench warfare would not be viable in the age of armor and air power and instead deployed highly mobile units, using their relatively scarce, but well-designed and highly effective, armor as infantry support. Their error was not the decision to eschew trench warfare, but rather in placing most of their troops in the north, where the mines and other high value targets were; they simply could not keep up with the German armor, were unable to reach their defensive targets, and, once overrun, could not regroup effectively to help defend Lvov and Warsaw, and were pinned down (and mowed down) by the Luftwaffe. Even so, they defended Warsaw in the face of continuous bombing, much targeted at civilian and infrastructure targets, for over two weeks, and could have continued for several more, had General Kutrzeba not concluded that the civilian situation was too dire to continue and started capitulation talks.
Much has been made, propagandawise, of the so-called 'Western Betrayal' of Poland in the war, but I think it *is* fair to say that when push came to shove the Western powers' hearts simply weren't into diving into war for the sake of a country they'd reconstituted only twenty years before, and more for the sake of sticking it to Germany than solidarity to the long-embattled Polish people. The real tragedy of that is that the German commander Alfred Jodl confessed openly at the end of the war that
the Germans survived 1939 "only because approximately 110 French and English divisions in the West, which during the campaign on Poland were facing 25 German divisions, remained completely inactive."
While their ability to mobilize those divisions in a meaningful timeframe is in some question (although 90 French divisions faced 20 German on their western line and had in fact been mobilized in the first week of September), there is no question whatsoever that Hitler was a master of the bluff, and they believed they faced far greater forces. It is perhaps a bit karmic to think that by failing to do so while they had the advantage they condemned not only Poland, but their home soil, to years of occupation if only a shadow of the massive destruction Poland suffered.
Then again, I don't think that either country could have imagined the willingness to destroy civilians and infrastructure implicit in Hitler's concept of "Total War" (Hitler's later stated intent was to wipe Warsaw off the map, turning it into a transit station, and 85% of Warsaw was eventually levelled in 1944 after the uprising), and unfortunately, seemed to take the wrong lessons from it.
I hope that this long post was neither too boring nor presumptuous, but I took the opportunity of the anniversary to read up on much that I had not known about the events leading up to, and during, the invasion and thought it was worth reflecting on in light of the fact that the last witnesses are passing on and in light of what how these events have shaped us since with regard to our 'white Western guilt' as it were, what and whom we deem worthy of defending, and at what cost.
Regards,
Nydia
P.S. Halo, check your PMs!