Nydia Ywalmoriel
07-01-2008, 12:22 AM
Evening all :)
Partially in response to Fildien's lament about all the doom and gloom around here, and partially because it's an area of interest to me on multiple levels (population control, gender dynamics), I found this article in the NYT's Magazine this weekend about the population decline in Europe and parts of Asia (specifically Japan and South Korea) interesting:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/29/magazine/29Birth-t.html?em&ex=1214971200&en=bed4d53d7077a0c3&ei=5070
As much as, globally, overpopulation is *still* much more of a concern than population loss (even if the planet reached ZPG today, there are arguably half again to three times as many humans *currently* inhabiting the planet than it can sustainably support over the long haul, and a controlled drop is needed), the birth rate has, in some of the developed countries, dropped to the 'collapse' point, which is about 1.3 children per female, or a 45% rate of decline.
What makes this article interesting takes one about to page 4 to get to, but the authors took at a look at demographic and sociological data for all of the EU countries plus 'developed' Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, India) to try to identify what factors contributed to more or less sustainable population replacement versus steep decline - and the results may surprise some people.
What they found, simply put, is that there is a point in the 'modernization' curve where *demands*, in terms of cost of living, pace of living, etc, have transitioned from pastoral>industrial>post-industrial, but the evolution of gender roles/parity has not caught up - and it is at this 'pinch point', where women are expected to shoulder the lion's share of the costs of childbearing/rearing, employment, *and* cost in terms of lost opportunity/income (in an expensive modern society) if they leave work
to bear and raise children, something has to give, and it is, as the article puts it, that's society's future. Tellingly, the three countries whose populations are in a death spiral, Japan, South Korea, and Italy, all share something in common: cultures where a woman's decision to leave the workforce to raise children is usually enforced as a permanent one.
Later on in the article (page 5 is the real meat of it), the authors discuss two different approaches to dealing with that bottleneck utilized by different countries who have managed to maintain replacement, or near-replacement: the Scandanavian countries and the US. The northern European countries have the highest reproductive rates in Europe (~1.9 children per woman), and it's no mystery why; women who choose to give birth in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, or Iceland are guaranteed a year of maternity leave at 80% salary, and to have their jobs available to them when they return (not to mention receive a payment when they give birth); and fathers are entitled to 6 weeks paternity leave, more under certain circumstances. By contrast, few resources, even such as child care, are available for Italian mothers, yet the cost of living throughout Europe fairly demands the two income family.
In the US, our relatively poor record with regard to maternal support (no subsidized child care, minimal maternity leave, lack of subsidized medicine, real and substantive hits to lifetime income incurred as a result of leaving the workforce for any length of time to raise children, and even if one doesn't (I mentioned this in an article some time back)) is offset by the flexibility of employment options in a general sense in this country, as opposed to elsewhere in the developed world with regard to things like temp work, part time work, and flex time, and the US reproductive rate is back up to 2.1 for the first time since the 1960s, which is right at replacement; we gain due to immigration, as does Great Britain.
I find all of this interesting because, as a woman of a certain age who declined to have children partially because of my own interests outside of childrearing, partially due to (genetic, heritable) health reasons, and partially due to an acute perception of what those 'costs' would be as a woman growing up in the US during the 1970s, I could not help but be aware that a hefty majority of my generation of women (those who grew up during the 'first wave' of modern feminism) delayed and downsized or opted out of childbearing, while those 20 years behind us are already starting families in their '20s. It's a good sign, I think, in terms of where we've come in terms of our expectations with regards to rights and responsibilities in the parenting arena, as well as the employment arena - my own mother did *all* of the housework as well as worked full time, for much less money than my father, who was largely absent, did, once we went back to school,;and her life was more or less continuous drudgery (something that was not lost on my sister and I every time we watched her spend her entire weekend doing all the home entropy-fighting she could not keep up with during the week), whereas it's expected today that males will play a substantive role in raising and caring for their children in ways beyond the financial, and it's also much less common for women to be *openly* denied raises and promotions for absurd reasons such "well, Mr. Y has a *family* to support" or to have their positions engineered out of existence while on maternity leave. Younger women seem to have a confidence that this new social paradigm/contract will be upheld, and thus feel more secure taking on the risks and responsibilities of childbearing than mine, straddling the divide between the old and new, did, and I hope it really is the germ of a more advanced and equitable society here in the US - we're certainly going to need all the help we can get given the looming economic crisis.
Finally, the section discussing European cities and their recognition that some of them are *shrinking*, not growing, and will be for the forseeable future, and the need and opportunity that presents for dealing with this constructively, was a pleasant thing to read. What a nice day it will be when we ourselves can stop tearing up corn and cotton fields for more endless subdivisions, and develop our spaces so as to serve fewer people, better?
In closing, I supposed I'd like to say that I found this article refreshing because of its very balanced perspective; typically, when authors weigh in on population issues, they are either over- or under-population alarmists; the former shrilly declaring that if we don't stop breeding immediately, that we are going to hopelessly poison and degrade the earth (while overpopulation increases the danger of this, a smaller population is as capable of messily exploiting and degrading the earth's resources in the name of profit), and the latter laying the blame for the demographic transition in Europe and Asia squarely at the foot of women and warning us that civilization will be lost if we don't get back in the kitchen (bedroom) and get to outbreeding all those brown folks in the UDCs. It brings up the very valid point that demographic transition isn't a simple curve from high to low but one that has inflection points based on what stresses are present in the populations undergoing them and that, more importantly, that there is a light at the end of the tunnel and, isn't it nice that that light might involve/require producing a more equitable society as part of the process?
Regards,
Nydia
Partially in response to Fildien's lament about all the doom and gloom around here, and partially because it's an area of interest to me on multiple levels (population control, gender dynamics), I found this article in the NYT's Magazine this weekend about the population decline in Europe and parts of Asia (specifically Japan and South Korea) interesting:
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/29/magazine/29Birth-t.html?em&ex=1214971200&en=bed4d53d7077a0c3&ei=5070
As much as, globally, overpopulation is *still* much more of a concern than population loss (even if the planet reached ZPG today, there are arguably half again to three times as many humans *currently* inhabiting the planet than it can sustainably support over the long haul, and a controlled drop is needed), the birth rate has, in some of the developed countries, dropped to the 'collapse' point, which is about 1.3 children per female, or a 45% rate of decline.
What makes this article interesting takes one about to page 4 to get to, but the authors took at a look at demographic and sociological data for all of the EU countries plus 'developed' Asia (China, Japan, South Korea, India) to try to identify what factors contributed to more or less sustainable population replacement versus steep decline - and the results may surprise some people.
What they found, simply put, is that there is a point in the 'modernization' curve where *demands*, in terms of cost of living, pace of living, etc, have transitioned from pastoral>industrial>post-industrial, but the evolution of gender roles/parity has not caught up - and it is at this 'pinch point', where women are expected to shoulder the lion's share of the costs of childbearing/rearing, employment, *and* cost in terms of lost opportunity/income (in an expensive modern society) if they leave work
to bear and raise children, something has to give, and it is, as the article puts it, that's society's future. Tellingly, the three countries whose populations are in a death spiral, Japan, South Korea, and Italy, all share something in common: cultures where a woman's decision to leave the workforce to raise children is usually enforced as a permanent one.
Later on in the article (page 5 is the real meat of it), the authors discuss two different approaches to dealing with that bottleneck utilized by different countries who have managed to maintain replacement, or near-replacement: the Scandanavian countries and the US. The northern European countries have the highest reproductive rates in Europe (~1.9 children per woman), and it's no mystery why; women who choose to give birth in Norway, Sweden, Denmark, or Iceland are guaranteed a year of maternity leave at 80% salary, and to have their jobs available to them when they return (not to mention receive a payment when they give birth); and fathers are entitled to 6 weeks paternity leave, more under certain circumstances. By contrast, few resources, even such as child care, are available for Italian mothers, yet the cost of living throughout Europe fairly demands the two income family.
In the US, our relatively poor record with regard to maternal support (no subsidized child care, minimal maternity leave, lack of subsidized medicine, real and substantive hits to lifetime income incurred as a result of leaving the workforce for any length of time to raise children, and even if one doesn't (I mentioned this in an article some time back)) is offset by the flexibility of employment options in a general sense in this country, as opposed to elsewhere in the developed world with regard to things like temp work, part time work, and flex time, and the US reproductive rate is back up to 2.1 for the first time since the 1960s, which is right at replacement; we gain due to immigration, as does Great Britain.
I find all of this interesting because, as a woman of a certain age who declined to have children partially because of my own interests outside of childrearing, partially due to (genetic, heritable) health reasons, and partially due to an acute perception of what those 'costs' would be as a woman growing up in the US during the 1970s, I could not help but be aware that a hefty majority of my generation of women (those who grew up during the 'first wave' of modern feminism) delayed and downsized or opted out of childbearing, while those 20 years behind us are already starting families in their '20s. It's a good sign, I think, in terms of where we've come in terms of our expectations with regards to rights and responsibilities in the parenting arena, as well as the employment arena - my own mother did *all* of the housework as well as worked full time, for much less money than my father, who was largely absent, did, once we went back to school,;and her life was more or less continuous drudgery (something that was not lost on my sister and I every time we watched her spend her entire weekend doing all the home entropy-fighting she could not keep up with during the week), whereas it's expected today that males will play a substantive role in raising and caring for their children in ways beyond the financial, and it's also much less common for women to be *openly* denied raises and promotions for absurd reasons such "well, Mr. Y has a *family* to support" or to have their positions engineered out of existence while on maternity leave. Younger women seem to have a confidence that this new social paradigm/contract will be upheld, and thus feel more secure taking on the risks and responsibilities of childbearing than mine, straddling the divide between the old and new, did, and I hope it really is the germ of a more advanced and equitable society here in the US - we're certainly going to need all the help we can get given the looming economic crisis.
Finally, the section discussing European cities and their recognition that some of them are *shrinking*, not growing, and will be for the forseeable future, and the need and opportunity that presents for dealing with this constructively, was a pleasant thing to read. What a nice day it will be when we ourselves can stop tearing up corn and cotton fields for more endless subdivisions, and develop our spaces so as to serve fewer people, better?
In closing, I supposed I'd like to say that I found this article refreshing because of its very balanced perspective; typically, when authors weigh in on population issues, they are either over- or under-population alarmists; the former shrilly declaring that if we don't stop breeding immediately, that we are going to hopelessly poison and degrade the earth (while overpopulation increases the danger of this, a smaller population is as capable of messily exploiting and degrading the earth's resources in the name of profit), and the latter laying the blame for the demographic transition in Europe and Asia squarely at the foot of women and warning us that civilization will be lost if we don't get back in the kitchen (bedroom) and get to outbreeding all those brown folks in the UDCs. It brings up the very valid point that demographic transition isn't a simple curve from high to low but one that has inflection points based on what stresses are present in the populations undergoing them and that, more importantly, that there is a light at the end of the tunnel and, isn't it nice that that light might involve/require producing a more equitable society as part of the process?
Regards,
Nydia