I got the book "Red Star Rogue" for Christmas- it's quite an interesting read. The website for it is http://www.redstarrogue.com/ if you want to check it out.

Anyway, the book is about the K-129 Golf II class sub that sank under unknown circumstances in 1968 and was at least partially raised by the Glomar Explorer years later. According to the authors, there was a lot more to the story than was leaked to the public.

For example, the sub sank just 400 miles from Hawaii, far from it's assigned patrol area. It had an extra 11 crewmembers over and above the normal complement mysteriously assigned to the mission. The sub had suddenly refused to send routine status reports shortly after reaching open sea for the first time in it's history. It was on the surface when it exploded at an even junction of longitude and lattitude (a requirement for the Chinese to aim their seaborne missiles, but not for the Soviets). The sub chosen closely resembled the only type of missile sub owned by the Chinese at the time (Golf I class) and was launching from a distance consistent with the Chinese maximum range but far closer than the Soviets were capable of.

The authors theorize that a small core of KGB hardliners in the Soviet Union arranged a takeover of the sub and sent it to frame the Chinese for a nuclear attack on the US. At the time, the Soviets and the Chinese were at each other's throats having had a falling out a few years before. The idea was to get the US and China to nuke each other without involving the USSR. The sub made it to it's launching station far outside it's normal patrol box and attempted to launch a 1 megaton missile at Pearl Harbor. It was only thwarted by a failsafe mechanism unfamiliar to the perpetrators. The failsafe (not widely known outside a small circle in the Soviet navy) caused the missile to explode in it's launch tube when the proper launch code was not entered causing the catastrophic damage to the sub.

The authors further theorize that the US discovered what had happened after they found and examined the wreck. Nixon had then used the information to politically blackmail the Soviets and open up relations with China in the early 70's. He authorized the Glomar Explorer mission to obtain the physical proof of the perfidy, not for recovering already obsolete intelligence on an older Soviet submarine type.

If any of the theories of the book are remotely close to the truth, we all dodged a huge bullet in 1968. A far bigger bullet than even the Cuban missile crisis. It really makes you wonder.

I recommend the book, along with another called "Blind Man's Bluff" detailing the activities of the US submarines during the cold war. Good stuff and very thought provoking.

Interesting concept to say the least. Life today would be vastly different if that nuke had hit it's designated target. Tensions were so high at the time that it's hard to see us turning the other cheek or looking the other way.

Fandros

Did Jack Ryan save the day?

Well... first off, the real story behind that sub is not that 'glamorous', though unfortunately I cant share it (which sucks, cause it IS a pretty interesting story). Suffice it to say, they weren't going to try to launch a nuke at pearl harbor.

Now, for this part:
It was only thwarted by a failsafe mechanism unfamiliar to the perpetrators. The failsafe (not widely known outside a small circle in the Soviet navy) caused the missile to explode in it's launch tube when the proper launch code was not entered causing the catastrophic damage to the sub.The author was having a good time with this one. From an engineering design perspective, this would be known as a 'poor design'. Essentially he's saying that if the incorrect code is entered, then the entire submarine will be destroyed. Huh? That seems like an awful waste - imagine that the crew accidentally typo's the code during a test launch. Oops! Scratch one very expensive submarine, and it's trained crew (which will take a while to replace), and the nice expensive missiles with warheads. And just for added measure, let's make sure that only a small 'elite circle' of people know about this failsafe...

Personally, if I were the USSR trying to perpetrate this, I'd make sure that the 'agents' I sent out to do it would know the ins and outs of the weapon systems, and know about those minor little things like the popular 'destruct on invalid code'. :)

Somehow, that sounds like a bit of fanciful hollywood style engineering.

In any case, I'm sure the book is a good bit of historical fiction, and entertaining. :)

That seems like an awful waste - imagine that the crew accidentally typo's the code during a test launch.

The way they explain it in the book is that the failsafe was on the implosion charge of the nuclear warhead itself. It was made to 'misfire' if the incorrect launch code was entered in a live-fire attempt, destroying the warhead without setting it off. No test missile would ever be tipped with an actual nuclear warhead so it would never come up *except* for an unauthorized launch attempt.

As far as the small circle of KGB people knowing the details of the failsafe, you might think so. However they theorize that the compartmentalization of the Soviet security forces prevented any one group from having all the information about the missile/warhead design. The navy had some info, the KGB had other info, and the top leadership had the rest. They think the KGB had mistakenly assumed they knew how to circumvent the launch code and enable a missile launch.

The book comes to its conclusions based on supposed off the record interviews with US personnel involved from the Halibut, others involved with the US intelligence summary, Soviet naval veterans who knew the crew of the K-129 and a lot of circumstancial evidence about the damage found on the sub and the unexplained presence of 11 extra "sailors" whom nobody from that naval base seemed to know.

Apparently the officially released cause of the explosion was supposed to have been hydrogen gas build up from the ship's batteries. According to rumor from supposed witnesses who had seen the photos taken by the Halibut, the damage seen on the sub did not match that theory (the majority of the damage was not near the battery storage area of the ship- it was concentrated around one of the missile tubes).

Anyway, read the book if you get a chance. They actually make the scenario sound plausible.

The way they explain it in the book is that the failsafe was on the implosion charge of the nuclear warhead itself. It was made to 'misfire' if the incorrect launch code was entered in a live-fire attempt, destroying the warhead without setting it off. No test missile would ever be tipped with an actual nuclear warhead so it would never come up *except* for an unauthorized launch attempt.
Firstly, this explanation still doesnt address a typo by a legitimate crew trying to launch the missile. This whole thing just seems excessive - why destroy the entire ship when you can just disable the missile? Now, as far as 'typing in the code', well I dont know how the soviets and chinese set up their launch systems in the Golf class, but American subs have never had an authorization code that you 'type in', or enter or whatever. The only information that goes into a missile is targeting and launch configuration information. The 'code' is completely handled and verified by people.

Secondly, detonating the implosion charge = nuclear warhead detonation. Even if they could come up with a plausible scenario that it wouldn't initiate prompt criticality in the warhead, it would still be risky and overkill compared to another method.

Essentially, if a missile's fuel is ignited (as if it were launching), and the missile was prevented from exiting the tube (easily done), this would sink the sub. (American subs have a bunch of heavy duty safeguards to prevent anything like this from happening due to the absolute severity of this casualty - there's no recovery from it, the sub's going down).

Again, anything like this level of 'failsafe' seems extraordinarily excessive and potentially expensive. Disabling the missile launch system or even just the warhead arming electronics would be sufficient if you're wanting to ensure that a nuclear missile isnt improperly used.

As an added observation, there's no reason that they needed to get within 400 miles of Hawaii - the missiles that the Golf's carried had a range of up to 800 miles. In fact, it's better to stay farther away as it gives less time for detection. There's a great deal of seabed around the Hawaiian Islands that have had sonar arrays since the 60's.

In any case, I might pick up the book sometime just to peruse its ideas, but what you've told me is contained in the book differs greatly from the 'official classified report' on this incident.

My understanding of the Cold War Soviet war machine is such that there was very lil trust given by the upper command to individual commanders. By that I mean they'd have a politburo rep with the codes etc etc.

One could almost imagine they , the politburo, would want to set up a scenerio where no living witness's could lead back to the Soviet Union should things go awry.

Fandros

'destruct on invalid code'

Now I have the mission impossible theme stuck in my head :p

Secondly, detonating the implosion charge = nuclear warhead detonation. Even if they could come up with a plausible scenario that it wouldn't initiate prompt criticality in the warhead, it would still be risky and overkill compared to another method.

Actually that's just not true. The implosion charges are segmented and must be detonated simultaneously for criticality to be achieved (its actually quite difficult to time it just right). Each explosive segment has it's own detonator. By setting off only one segment, the warhead is blown apart without reaching criticality. All it does is spread the nuclear material around and possibly set off the missile fuel.

Again, anything like this level of 'failsafe' seems extraordinarily excessive and potentially expensive. Disabling the missile launch system or even just the warhead arming electronics would be sufficient if you're wanting to ensure that a nuclear missile isnt improperly used.

Keep in mind the paranoia of the Soviet system. If someone unauthorized had gained access to a nuclear missile, they would want the missile destroyed beyond the ability to salvage the warhead. A Golf II submarine had 3 missiles and 2 nuclear tipped torpedos. If someone has improper access to one, he had access to all on board. I can easily see where they would want the missile/vessel destroyed.

My understanding is that there were other manual (non-lethal) failsafes that were in place as well and had to have been bypassed first before the last failsafe could be activated by an improper launch signal. An 'accidental' launch was incredibly unlikely as they used a similar multiple key system to US weapon release procedures. The book did not go into great detail on the steps to launch sequence of a Soviet submarine, but kept to general terms.

As an added observation, there's no reason that they needed to get within 400 miles of Hawaii - the missiles that the Golf's carried had a range of up to 800 miles. In fact, it's better to stay farther away as it gives less time for detection. There's a great deal of seabed around the Hawaiian Islands that have had sonar arrays since the 60's.

Exactly. Why would the Russians have launched from only 400 miles away when their missiles had 800 mile range? The author's theory is that they were trying to make it look like a Chinese Golf I with 400 mile range missiles was attacking. They knew the launch site would be immediately known and it would have been yet another circumstance pointing at China as the attacker instead of the Soviets. The Soviets were as yet unaware of how good the US tracking and identification was, so their plot would not have worked in any case, but they did not know that at the time. They were simply trying to do everything they could to implicate Mao as the villain.

The other reasons they theorize it was an unauthorized launch attempt come from some of the circumstancial evidence. The Chinese style launch profile for example. The sub in question had the ability to launch its missiles while submerged (and would certainly do so under normal situations for survivability reasons) and did not need to be at exact longitude-latitude marks to target accurately, but the Chinese Golf I's had to launch while surfaced from no further than 400 miles away and only from such marks. According to the book, the sub was definitely on the surface at the time of the mishap as the flash from the explosion was caught by a US satellite and one of the bodies photographed and/or recovered was still in foul weather gear. The missiles themselves carried nuclear material obtained from the Chinese before their falling out, so the radioactive traces from a detonation would have pointed to China as the source. From the air, the Soviet Golf II was indistinguishable in appearance from a Chinese Golf I (coincidentally the only missile armed sub the Chinese owned.)

Other circumstancial evidence includes the extremely unusual crew size and makeup, sudden changes made to Soviet nuclear procedures shortly after the incident (i.e. the KGB lost the job of keeping control of *all* Soviet nuclear warheads which they had held prior to the incident) and the "fall from grace" of a number of hardline Stalinists about that time.

They also reference a claim that more than just a few bodies were recovered by the US, that in fact that seventy four out of ninety eight on board were recovered. Supposedly, a huge congregation of bodies was found in the forward compartments of the boat, far away from any escape hatch and away from normal duty stations. The theory was that it was the normal crew, rounded up by the 11 mystery men at gunpoint and confined to the forward section of the boat while the launch was taking place.

Of course this *could* all be just a really imaginitive conspiracy theory, but it does make some degree of sense.

Definately going to give this a read, I for a very short time (damn knee) was in navy as a power plant operator on a sub.

Actually that's just not true. The implosion charges are segmented and must be detonated simultaneously for criticality to be achieved (its actually quite difficult to time it just right). Each explosive segment has it's own detonator. By setting off only one segment, the warhead is blown apart without reaching criticality. All it does is spread the nuclear material around and possibly set off the missile fuel. My apologies that I didnt explain this one further. Yes, the shaped charges all need to be detonated within a tight tolerance of time. But, the builders/designers of the warhead do all that ahead of time and then seal up the warhead. The only signal that gets into the system after it's all sealed up is the detonate signal, there's no 'individual charge detonation' signals. The only way you can detonate individual charges is to open up the warhead itself - not a trivial task.

Now, I suppose (going on the 'paranoid soviet' conspiracy theory line) that they designed their warheads to support the 'auto-destruct on invalid code' failsafe and have their warheads have the ability to detonate a single charge. That said, I doubt that one (or even a few) of the shaped charges on a warhead could cause the sinking of the sub, and again, the easier way to disable the warhead/entire sub is just to ignite the propellant while the missile restraint systems are still engaged.

A lot of this theory hinges on a (seemingly exaggerated) paranoia, an overly complicated and exceedingly costly protection system, and the testimony of several (many?) unnamed people disseminating Top Secret information (which if their names were found out and this information was true, would land them in a federal penitentiary for the rest of their lives - the government doesnt take release of Top Secret info that lightly - unless you're a high ranking politician...).

Also, the official report I've read on it would have to have been fabricated (which is always possible of course).

Essentially, given all the stipulations above, I'll say it's possible (anything is possible)... but wow - that's a lot of 'ifs' and 'coverups/fabrications'.

I am idly curious as to how the 'russian agents' actually got on board the sub and took it over from the chinese crew. Also, as to the 'extra 11 crewmembers over the ships complement', well, at least in the american naval submarines, the variance of personnel on board to the normal crew complement is upwards of 30 people or more depending on what's going on. Sometimes divisions are short personnel due to early-outs (due to various reasons), or VIP's on board, or an assessment team (for an ORSE or TRE), or spec-ops personnel, tech's on board testing a new system, etc. A differentiation of 11 crew members for a normal 80 person crew isnt that unusual.

We had civilian contractors on pretty frequently to allow them to witness the performance of their designs 'in the field'. Amusingly, one of the contractors swore up and down that some heavy duty breakers that he helped design were created in such a way as to never fail. We of course laughed at him (breakers failing is a common occurance), and he stuck to his guns. Later that trip, a breaker for a large pump failed. We of course gave him a lot of ribbing. :) Just a side story, and (to me) an amusing look at the mindset of designers, and the difference between their world and the real world. I find it amusing that any designer would claim that their mechanical device was fail-proof. Digression, sorry.

Definately going to give this a read, I for a very short time (damn knee) was in navy as a power plant operator on a sub. A fellow nuke! Mind if I ask what rating (if enlisted) and sub?

. It was on the surface when it exploded at an even junction of longitude and lattitude (a requirement for the Chinese to aim their seaborne missiles, but not for the Soviets).

Since Jensae fairly thoroughly covered why no missile system would have that kind of criminally unsafe fail-safe, I'd like to ask how you get that exact a longitudal computation without GPS in 1968, and why on earth that would possibly matter to the missile launch system. Unless the Russians didn't know about decimal notation and you could only fire missiles at targets located on whole number coordinates...

I'm pretty sure they've been figuring out fairly accurate long/lat for quite some time using a sextant and charts.

Fandros

You'd think the Chinese would at least think to attach a sextant to their missiles.

Damn, gotta read this now. :D

I'd like to ask how you get that exact a longitudal computation without GPS in 1968As Fandros said, determining your lat-long position to a reasonable degree of accuracy is possible by just looking at stars - in fact, we still practice it on subs today. It's a huge pain in the ass though, and the accuracy isnt all that good, hence the accuracy of the nuke wont be that good... but it's a nuke, so depending on your needs just getting within a couple of miles is sufficient. If you're wanting to take out a hardened target on the other hand, then much tighter accuracy is needed.

I'm not actually sure why we still do it as we have multiple redundant systems, each with backups nowadays (GPS, 2 extremely high accuracy gyros, dead reckoning, etc.), but /shrug.

Now, as to why they needed to be on an exact lat-long intersection, well my only guess for that is that they (chinese/russians) weren't able to make decent targeting calculation computers in the 60's that were portable (had space on the sub for it I mean), and instead compiled a table of precalculated targeting information based on launch origins at lat-long intersections, and pre-determined targets. That's the best I can come up with. It seems awfully restrictive on your launching platform though, and makes it a lot easier to hunt down their subs if you know this info as you significantly narrow down where they can be.

I know how you do it with a "reasonable" degree of accuracy, I've done it myself while sailing for fun. But that "reasonable" degree of accuracy is nowhere near reasonable enough to say that you are currently at a precisely even junction of whole number lat/long coordinates. Particularly near Hawaii where the traverse of a longitudal point is something like 50 miles.

I suppose I can believe the pre-calculated launch solutions for specific targets, but combined with all the other improbabilities about the book my skeptic alarm is still on high. Ballistic trajectory isn't that hard to compute, even at that distance with the Coriolis effect and all. The Germans were bombarding Paris during WWI from a range of 200 miles with unguided artillery shells.

But that "reasonable" degree of accuracy is nowhere near reasonable enough to say that you are currently at a precisely even junction of whole number lat/long coordinates. It mostly depends on what 'reasonable' is for your particular task, and 'precisely' at the junction is also relative. I do agree though that it sounds questionable, and I think there were likely better methods for achieving the targeting goal, even with the assumed restrictions of technology at the time. I just threw out the above as a possible idea.

...but combined with all the other improbabilities about the book my skeptic alarm is still on high.I suppose it's obvious from my previous posts, but I heartily agree. :)

am idly curious as to how the 'russian agents' actually got on board the sub and took it over from the chinese crew.

I guess I wasn't clear. No actual Chinese were involved in any way. Because the Russian sub in question was ordered out again unexpectedly shortly after having just returned from a patrol, the captain had granted furlough to a number of the crew to visit families. He had expected a couple months of downtime but instead received an order to sail again while a number of his crew were gone. As a result, he had to fill out his crew from other sailors at the base. This was done, but the day before sailing an additional 11 "sailors" whom no one knew (they were not from the base) appeared and presented orders that looked genuine. As a result he was forced to sail with 11 men over and above the standard complement on what was supposed to be an extended cruise.

The theory is that the 11 were members of the osnaz (KGB version of the spetznaz). Smuggling weapons aboard would have been a simple matter for them as sailors were rarely checked for contraband. Also of interest was that the crew roster, normally filed in triplicate in several locations, was found to be missing from *all* locations shortly after the incident when the investigations began in the Soviet Union.

Apparently, the plot is theorized to have been most likely hatched by Suslov and Andropov with the KGB at the time. Breshnev was kept in the dark as was the rest of the politburo. Only a couple of high ranking naval officers would have needed to be involved in preparing the orders to sail earlier than normal and with the oversize crew.

This would all be a neat idea if the CHinese actually had the capability to nuke the US back in 1968. As of something like 5 years ago, they still only had 20 missiles capable of making it to the States.

Per the last few posts, "fairly accurate" isn't good enough for ballistic missiles. A degree here or there in a ballistic missile translates into at least miles at the other end. A few miles off turns 1 million casualties into 100k or less and more importantly means you have ZERO capability of taking out hostile missile sites or bunkers. Which means your missiles are pretty much worthless. Killing civilians is nice, but it's the hostile army/navy/air force/chain of command you have to stop.

"Blind Man's Bluff" is a good fast fun read. I think the book about the NSA, "Body of Secrets" may also touch on this.

This would all be a neat idea if the CHinese actually had the capability to nuke the US back in 1968. No, they didnt have the ability to hit the US from Chinese soil back then... but they DID have subs capable of launching missiles within 800 miles. Hence this part of the story:
For example, the sub sank just 400 miles from Hawaii, far from it's assigned patrol area.
Per the last few posts, "fairly accurate" isn't good enough for ballistic missiles.
It's plenty good enough if your goal isnt just to 'inflict as many civilian casualties as possible', or 'take out military targets'. If your goal is merely to initiate an attack on a country and frame another, then just getting the missile to fire and the warhead to detonate on that country's soil is plenty good enough to achieve your goal. It appeared to me that this goal was pretty clearly outlined in Gulor's post.

I guess I wasn't clear. No actual Chinese were involved in any way. Went back and reread the original post. Here's how I had interpreted it:
The authors theorize that a small core of KGB hardliners in the Soviet Union arranged a takeover of the [Chinese] sub and sent it to frame the Chinese for a nuclear attack on the US. I assumed that because I didnt think they had to arrange a takeover of their own country's sub. :) But yes, I see the reasoning that was put forth for the need to 'take it over' based on the distrust within the country.

Yep the theorized takeover was of the Soviet sub K-129 by rogue elements in the KGB , hence the title of the book.

As far as the Chinese go, their land based missiles were not capable of hitting the mainland US at the time, but they did have a number of subs provided by the Soviets before they got pissed at each other. Presumably those subs were armed with nuclear torpedoes, one of which could destroy a port city of the US if the sub managed to get close enough to launch into the harbor without being sunk. If I remember correctly they had less than a handful of missile subs (all Golf I type), but each had three missiles with 400 mile range (they didn't yet have the 800 mile range missiles the Russians had developed.)

No, they didnt have the ability to hit the US from Chinese soil back then... but they DID have subs capable of launching missiles within 800 miles. Hence this part of the story:

heheheheh. Come on, man. If we had them starting in the 60s, I don't think CHina had them in '68. Wikipedia says CHina had their first missile sub in '81; take that with a grain of salt.

Wikipedia in general is not the best source to go by with topics that are highly debatable, simply because you can edit it to say the exact opposite of what was said before.

This (http://www.penny-arcade.com/comic/2005/12/16) comic from Penny Arcade explains it the best I think.

heheheheh. Come on, man. If we had them starting in the 60s, I don't think CHina had them in '68. Wikipedia says CHina had their first missile sub in '81; take that with a grain of salt.The wikipedia link is fine, I just checked it out. But you misread it - it merely states that they didnt BUILD and DEPLOY their first SSBN until then.

But... they arent the only communist nation on Earth, and Russia was more (http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/cno/n87/usw/issue_21/humble2.htm) than happy to help them out by selling them their Golf type submarine (as well as several others, including the Kilo), including providing specialists and documentation.
China’s relations with the United States during this time were also very tense. In addition to testing its first atomic weapon in October 1964, Beijing was actively supporting North Vietnam in its escalating war. Just before the great rift opened between China and the USSR, the PLAN had received a kit and associated plans for a “Golf”-class ballistic missile submarine from the Soviets, and it was launched at Dalian in 1964. Washington was so perturbed by this development that a serious proposal was made – but subsequently rejected – to execute a preemptive attack against this vessel on its maiden voyage.